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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal of the criminal conviction of the Defendant after a court
trial in the Lemhi County Magistrate Court for one count of Second Degree
Stalking.
B.

Statement of Facts

1.

Christopher Dean resides in the Carmen area of Lemhi County. (R at 8,

2.

He and his wife built a large garage behind their home which they call the

69).

“carriage house.” (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 1-2).
3.

This garage has a spacious upstairs that can be rented as a one- or two-

bedroom apartment. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 1-3)(R at 69).
4.

In 2010, a young woman rented one bedroom of the upstairs as an

apartment. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 1:25-2:9).(R at 69).
5.

A dividing door separates her one-bedroom apartment from the additional

bedroom (which the Deans kept as an office) and an additional bathroom. (Testimony
of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 2-3)(R at 69).
6.

A small hallway led to the dividing doorway, and this hallway contained

a small washer and dryer combination which the tenant was allowed to use. (Testimony
of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 5, 7, 8).
7.

There is no dispute that sometime in October, 2010, Natasha Mullins

moved into the “carriage house” behind the Dean residence. (Testimony of Cynthia
Dean, September 18, 2012, 1-2)(R at 69).
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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8.

The carriage house had a large apartment built on the second floor.

(Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 1-2).
9.

Although the second floor has a total of two bedrooms and two bathrooms,

the second floor can be divided by means of a locked door (“dividing door”) into a onebedroom, one-bathroom apartment. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012,
1-3)(R at 70).
10.

There is no dispute that the original lease entered into by the parties

involved only the one bedroom, one-bathroom area. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins,
June 24, 2013, 22)(R at 69-70).
11.

On the other side of the dividing door was a bedroom (“outer bedroom”)

which was being used by Cynthia Dean as an office. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean,
September 18, 2012, 1-2)(R at 69-70).
12.

This office door could be locked. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September

18, 2012, 8).
13.

A washer and dryer was accessible from the common hallway which lead

from the top of the stairs to the dividing door. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September
18, 2012, 5-7).
14.

The second bathroom (“outer bathroom”) was not locked. (Testimony of

Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 8-10).
15.

Although there is some dispute whether Ms. Mullins routinely used the

outer bathroom, it is clear at least at one point it was being used to house the litter box
for the Deans’ cats. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 126-127).
16.

The relationship between the Deans and Ms. Mullins was amicable for
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several months. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 23:23-25, 24:1) (R at
69).
17.

Ms. Mullins stated she considered the Deans to be friends. (Testimony of

Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 23:23-25, 24:1) (R at 69).
18.

The Deans travel out of the area for extended periods of time because of

their work. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 23:23-25, 15-16) (R at 69).
19.

During these extended absences Mullins would care for some of the

Deans’ animals. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 22-23).
20.

When the Deans were home they commonly had social interaction with

Ms. Mullins. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 23).
21.

Before the end of July, when Ms. Dean was scheduled to leave the area for

work, Ms. Mullins requested that she be allowed to rent the entire upstairs. (Testimony
of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 23:23-25, 14-15).
22.

Ms. Mullins stated that she moved into the additional area with Ms. Dean’s

permission. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 26).
23.

Ms. Dean however testified that she was unaware that Ms. Mullins had

moved anything into the outer rooms, stated she had never seen any of Ms. Mullins’
property in the outer rooms and specifically denied that she had given Ms. Mullins
permission to move any of her property into the outer rooms. (Testimony of Cynthia
Dean, September 18, 2012, 23:23-25, 14-15).
24.

It is however undisputed that Ms. Mullins did not sign a new lease or pay

any additional rent. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 98).
25.

However, Ms. Dean testified that although she began to move items out of
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her office, that they had not finalized any modification of the lease, and that she
intended to work out a new arrangement once she returned in mid-August. (Testimony
of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 23:23-25, 13-14).
26.

After Ms. Dean left, however, Ms. Mullins began moving some items into

the outer bedroom. (Testimony of Cynthia Dean, September 18, 2012, 23:23-25, 15-16).
27.

Ms. Mullins claimed that she had been using the outer bathroom “since

day one,” however Ms. Dean stated she had never seen any of Ms. Mullins’ personal
items in the outer bathroom. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 95-96).
28.

About a week after Ms. Dean left, Mr. Dean returned from an extended

absence for his work. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 27).
29.

Ms. Mullins testified from the very first day, and for every day after Mr.

Dean returned, she began noticing that her clothing and especially her underwear was
being disturbed. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 27-28).
30.

She did not have any evidence, such as pictures, to support this claim.

(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 29-30).
31.

Despite the fact that 1) Ms. Mullins lived in a fairly remote part of Lemhi

County, 2) Mr. Dean was living less than 100 yards away, 3) according to Mullins there
was no sign of forced entry and 4) Mr. Dean had keys to access the apartment, and 5)
Ms. Mullins testified she noticed the “disturbance” to her clothing only after Mr. Dean
returned on August 6, Ms. Mullins continued to socially interact with Mr. Dean.
(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 64).
32.

Ms. Mullins testified that on Friday, August 12, 2011, nearly a full week,

according to her testimony, after the disturbance to her clothing began, she and Mr.
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Page 4

Dean went to a concert in Custer County where they were together for most of the day.
(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 64).
33.

However, Ms. Mullins testified that while they were together, Mr. Dean

made an inappropriate comment, asking in effect “how much she would have to drink
before she would be willing to sleep with him.” (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June
24, 2013, 67).
34.

From this point on, the relationship between Ms. Mullins and Mr. Dean

soured significantly. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 84).
35.

On August 14, 2013, Ms. Mullins began taking photographs of a pile of

clothing in the outer bathroom. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 30).
36.

In a series of photos, Ms. Mullins claimed that twice on August 14, 2013,

after she returned after a few hours outside the apartment that her clothing had been
disturbed and rearranged. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 64).
37.

She claimed that on August 15, 2013, she set up a camera to capture who

was entering the outer bathroom. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013,3233).
38.

She also took pictures of the clothes in the outer bathroom. (Testimony

of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 31).
39.

Ms. Mullins claimed to make a video showing tennis shoes walking into

the outer bathroom being worn by Mr. Dean. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24,
2013, 35, 39).
40.

She also saw that the clothes were rearranged, although the picture also

indicated that a balloon that her son played with was now in the outer bathroom near
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the clothing. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 102).
41.

Armed with this evidence she then contacted the sheriff’s office.

(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 72, 77-84).
42.

Upon showing the deputies and the Sheriff the pictures and the video, she

was told by the deputies that they did not believe a crime had been committed.
(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 81-84).
43.

Ms. Mullins testified that the deputies advised her that unless there was a

video of the person’s face, there was nothing they could do. (Id.)
44.

She then returned to the apartment and according to previous testimony

during a motion to suppress, completely on her own decided to set up a video camera
in another location. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 84-85).
45.

Ms. Mullins then took a picture of clothing in the outer bathroom (but

nowhere else in the apartment) and left. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013,
69).
46.

Ms. Mullins claimed that upon her return she found that the video

captured Mr. Dean entering her apartment only minutes after she left at 6:22 p.m. for
dinner. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 74).
47.

Ms. Mullins testified that on the next day, August 16, she again took

pictures of clothing in the outer bathroom. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24,
2013, 87-88).
48.

Ms. Mullins claimed she also took pictures of the clothing in the basket in

the common hallway. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 87-89).
49.

Ms. Mullins claimed that she had not touched the basket between the time
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the video was taken the night before. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013,
87-89).
50.

Ms. Mullins then claimed that she took pictures of a box of underwear in

her bedroom (the bedroom which was part of her original lease). (Testimony of
Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 88-89).
51.

Upon her return in the afternoon, she took pictures to indicate that both

the clothing in the outer bathroom and her bedroom had been disturbed. (Testimony of
Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 93-94).
52.

Ms. Mullins stated that she never talked to or communicated in any way

with Mr. Dean reporting these disturbances. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24,
2013, 29-30).
53.

The next day, August 17, Ms. Mullins requested that the sheriff’s office

send personnel for a “civil standby” while she moved her items out of the apartment.
(Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 128-129).
54.

Other witnesses testified that Ms. Mullins removed items belonging to Ms.

Mullins from the outer bedroom.
55.

The sheriff’s office later confiscated a pair of Mr. Dean’s shoes, but

admitted that there otherwise was no investigation prior to issuing a ticket for stalking
to Mr. Dean.
56.

In August of 2011, the Lemhi County Sheriff’s office was contacted by the

tenant who complained that her undergarments were being disturbed. (Testimony of
Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 76).
57.

The Sheriff’s office initially stated there was not enough evidence to
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charge a crime. (Testimony of Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 81-84).
58.

The tenant left but returned with a video tape which she asserted proved

that Christopher Dean was entering her apartment without her approval. (Testimony of
Natashua Mullins, June 24, 2013, 38-39).
59.

After viewing the tape, a sheriff’s deputy issued a citation to Mr. Dean for

two counts of Stalking in the Second Degree for unlawfully entering the tenant’s
apartment on two occasions. (R at 8).
60.

The case was initiated by a citation charging two counts of “Stalking 2nd

Degree” alleged to have occurred on August 15, 2011, at 6 p.m. See Exhibit A. (R at 8).
61.

Both counts in the citation cited to Idaho Code § “18-7906(c)(4).” (R at 8).

62.

That code section states: “(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property

owned, leased or occupied by the victim;” (R at 23).
63.

It appears unquestionable from the face of the citation that the deputy was

charging the Defendant with entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased or
occupied by the victim on two occasions, resulting in two counts. (R at 8, 22-24).
64.

No statement of probable cause was filed in support of the citation. (R at

22-24).
65.

The initial appearance was September 6, 2011, and the Defendant pleaded

not guilty to the counts listed on the citation. (R at 9).
66.

The trial was continued until September 12, 2012. (R at 20).

67.

The Defendant hired a new attorney who substituted in on the case on

August 22, 2012. (Record of Actions, 08-22-2012).
68.

On August 27, 2012, the Defendant moved to dismiss the charges based
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on the fact that the citation failed to allege a crime. (R 22-25).
69.

In response, on August 30, 2012, the State replaced the citation with an

“amended complaint” charging two counts: Count I: Stalking in the Second Degree I.C.
18-7906; and Count II: Unlawful Entry I.C. § 18-7034. (R at 33-34).
70.

It is not disputed that this amended complaint was filed more than one

year after the alleged conduct, on August 30, 2012. (R at 33-34).
71.

There was no showing by affidavit or oral testimony of probable cause

contemporaneous with the filing of the citation or the complaint. (R at 33-34).
72.

A hearing was scheduled on September 18, 2012, concerning the

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (R at 35).
73.

At that hearing the Court allowed the victim to be called to establish

probable cause. (R at 46-51).
74.

The court did not allow cross examination of the complaining party. (R at

46-51).
75.

The Court ruled that the State could “amend” the complaint. (R at 32).

76.

Count II: Unlawful Entry was later dismissed by the Court because the

State had alleged that the Landlord had entered onto his own property, which is
expressly an exception in the statute. (R at 53-57).

C.

Course of the Proceedings.

08/15/2011

Citation Issued

08/22/2012

Substitution of Counsel-Randolph B. Neal

08/27/2012

Motion for dismissal of charges

08/27/2012

Motion in limine
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08/27/2012

Motion to suppress

08/31/2012

Motion for leave to file amended criminal complaint

09/04/2012

Amended Complaint Filed (including Count II: I.C. §18-7034
Unlawful Entry)

09/17/2012

Second Motion for dismissal of charges

10/17/2012

Order on Pretrial Motions

12/12/2012

Order on Pretrial Motions

06/23/2013

Count II: I.C. 18-7034 Unlawful Entry Dismissed by Court

06/24/2013

Second Amended Complaint Filed

06/24/2013

Court Trial - Court Finds Defendant Guilty (I.C. 18-7906 StalkingSecond Degree)

08/28/2013

Written Findings Issued by Court

09/09/2013

Motion for Reconsideration: Renewed Motion for Acquittal and
Dismissal of Charges

10/29/2013

Order on Motion to Reconsider

12/03/2013

Sentenced to Jail: 180 days. Suspended: 178 days.
Probation Ordered term: 2 years. (Supervised)
Sentenced to Pay Fine 637.50

12/18/2013

NOTICE OF APPEAL Appeal Filed in District Court

12/31/2013

Notice of Cross-Appeal

03/25/2014

Defendant’s Request for Trial De Novo Denied

03/19/2015

Oral Argument on Appeal

03/30/2015

Decision and Order - Appeal Denied

04/29/2015

NOTICE OF APPEAL - Appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court

II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

Page 10

1.

Did the lower courts err in not dismissing the sole remaining count

because of the facial deficiency of the citation and the statute of limitations?
2.

Did the lower courts err in not acquitting the Defendant because 1) the

State failed to show the requisite intent of malice, 2) the lower courts erred in its
definition of malice, and 3) the trial court fail to apply cannons of statutory construction
and the Rule of Lenity in this case to a vaguely worded statute?
3.

Did the trial court fail to have sufficient substantial and credible evidence

to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

III. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. Standard of Review
As to the trial court and district court interpretation of the statute, the Supreme
Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. VFP
VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 331, 109 P.3d 714, 719 (2005); State v. Yzaguirre, 144
Idaho 471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007).
When the appellate court considers whether the State presented sufficient
substantive evidence to support all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,
the applicable standard of review is whether there was substantial evidence upon
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571
(1996); State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 613 P.2d 938 (1980); State v. Buckley, 131 Idaho
179, 181, 953 P.2d 619, 621 (Ct. App. 1997), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 18,
1997), aff’d, 131 Idaho 164, 953 P.2d 604 (1998). Further, an appellate court reviews the
trial court record to determine whether substantial and competent evidence to support
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
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the findings of fact exists and whether the conclusions of law follow from those
findings. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 1 (2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser,
102 Idaho 559, 561, (1981)). See also State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161, (2000). An
appellate court will review the trial court’s findings of fact to determine if they are
clearly erroneous. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, (2007).
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IV. ARGUMENT
Introduction
This appeal is divided into three parts for the convenience and understanding of
the court. The first part discusses the denial of the Defendant’s motion for dismissal
based on the statute of limitations; the second part relates to the misinterpretation of
the charged statute by the magistrate court concerning the required intent to be proven;
and the third part relates to the clear error of the magistrate judge concerning his
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Part I: Statute of Limitations.
In Part I, this brief will examine the decision of the magistrate court on the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss filed in October of 2012. The case was delayed for a
significant amount of time in the magistrate court and new counsel was retained in
August of 2012. Upon review of the proceedings, Defense Counsel recognized the clear
errors made by the deputy sheriff who issued the citation to Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean was
cited for violation of Idaho Code § 8-7906(c)(4). It is apparent that the deputy sheriff
read the statute and concluded that it was unlawful for someone to “enter onto property
leased or occupied by the victim.” Since the tenant had provided video that the
Landlord had done so twice, the deputy charged two counts. After this error was
realized, the Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the State had failed to
charge a crime. The State responded by superseding the citation with an “Amended
Complaint.” The State then charged Defendant with one count of Stalking in the Second
Degree and one count of Unlawful Entry, purposely using the term “Amended
Complaint” in an attempt to circumvent the statute of limitation. There is no dispute

that the “amended complaint” was filed over a year after the alleged conduct occurred.
The count of Unlawful Entry was dismissed upon the motion of the Defendant as it
could not be applied to a Landlord entering his own property by the plain language of
the statute.
The initial citation cannot stand as the “original complaint” because it did not
charge a crime and was not submitted with a statement of probable cause. Thus, the
complaint in this case was filed after the statute of limitations, which in a misdemeanor
is one year. The charges must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Part II: Required Intent.
The second part addresses an error by the magistrate and district courts in
interpreting the applicable statute. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that,
even if Mr. Dean made the entries alleged, he did so with the malicious intent to “alarm,
annoy or harass the victim” or “cause a reasonable person substantial emotional
distress.” The magistrate court found that the stalking statute required the Defendant
act “knowingly and maliciously” and that the Defendant intend the act of entering the
apartment and have contact with her garments, and intend “illegal conduct.” Thus, the
Court did not require the State to prove any intent to alarm, annoy harass or cause
substantial emotional distress as required by the statute. Instead, the magistrate court
decided that a person only needed to intend the commission of an unlawful act. In this
case, the conduct with the unlawful intent is the unlawful conduct itself. Thus, the
magistrate court erred when it determined that no ill-will needed to be proven.
Part III: Lack of Substantial and Competent Evidence to Support Findings of Fact.
The tenant in this case lacked any semblance of credibility. The magistrate judge
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clearly erred when he identified an item in a video as being the tenant’s underwear.
The Defense was able to prove, through the evidence, that this finding was a clear error
and that the item was a sock. Further, it was not the item seen in the video, as the item
in the video was small and dark. When the error was pointed out to the magistrate court,
it agreed that the findings of fact had been “impeached.” This and other errant findings
of fact were relied upon heavily for purposes of finding guilt. Because they were in error
as will be discussed in detail below, the judgment of guilt must be vacated.
As a result, the Defendant is requesting that this matter be dismissed as it was
filed after the statute of limitations. Second, the judgment must be vacated because
there is no evidence to support the requisite intent of knowing and malicious conduct.
Finally, the judgment must be vacated because the magistrate court’s findings are not
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

PART I.
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE NEW AND ADDITIONAL
OFFENSE THAT WAS FILED BY THE STATE AFTER THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAD RUN.
A.

Factual Background

On August 20, 2011, the State attempted to charge Defendant with violations of
Idaho’s misdemeanor criminal laws by using an Idaho Uniform Citation (“uniform
citation”). (R. at 8). The August 20, 2011, uniform citation alleged that Defendant
committed two separate misdemeanor violations on August 15, 2011. According to the
uniform citation those two separate violations were:
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Id. This citation fails to charge an actual violation of Idaho misdemeanor criminal code.
Idaho Code (“I.C.”) § 18-7906(c)(4) as written on the uniform citation simply does not
exist. Defendant was thus left to guess the violation the State intended. To the extent
that the State intended to allege a “violation” of I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(iv), a violation of
this sub-section is not a crime. I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(4) is simply a definition. I.C. § 187906(2)(c)(4) states:
(2) As used in this section:
...
(c) “Nonconsensual contact” means any contact with the
victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s
consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent provided by
the victim, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed
desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued.
“Nonconsensual contact” includes, but is not limited to:
...
(iv) Entering onto or remaining on property owned,
leased or occupied by the victim;
...
I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(4). This sub-paragraph does not proscribe any activity or behavior.
It simply defines a term used in I.C. § 18-7906(2)(a). Handwriting on the uniform
citation designates the two separate violations as “Stalking 2nd Degree.” (R. at 8). Other
than a reference to the definition in I.C. 18-7906(c)(4), there are no facts written on the
uniform citation giving Defendant any clarity as to the violations he allegedly
committed on August 15, 2011. On its face and substantively, the uniform citation
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charged no violation of law.
Recognizing that the State had failed to charge any violations of law on the
deficient uniform citation, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. In reply to the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the State filed, on September 4, 2012, what it artfully
captioned as an “Amended Complaint.” (R. at 33). Unlike the August 20, 2011 uniform
citation, the September 4, 2012 “Amended Complaint” actually alleged a misdemeanor
violation. In relevant part, the “Amended Complaint” stated that Defendant “did
knowingly and maliciously engage in a course of conduct that seriously alarmed,
annoyed or harassed the victim and was such as would cause a reasonable person
substantial emotional distress, to wit, repeatedly and without her consent, entered onto
property leased or occupied by the victim.” (R. at 33-34). Although the State’s
“Amended Complaint” was once again facially deficient, as it charged violations of law
alleged to have occurred in August 2012, (R. at 33), and not in August 2011 as indicated
in the hand-written uniform citation. The real problem with the “Amended Complaint”
was the timing of its filing. See I.C. § 19-403 (a prosecution for any misdemeanor must
be commenced by the filing of the complaint or the finding of an indictment within one
(1) year after its commission); see also (R. at 46) (magistrate’s order stating it is “not
disputed” that the amended complaint was filed more than 1 year after the incident).
There is no dispute that the State’s “Amended Complaint” was filed on September 4,
2012. This is well after the one-year statute of limitations period for misdemeanor
criminal violations had expired.
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B.

Statute of Limitations.

Statutes of limitation in criminal cases create a bar to the prosecution. State v.
Bilbao, 38 Idaho 92, 222 P. 785 (1923), State v. Steensland, 33 Idaho 529, 195 P. 1080
(1921) (statutes of limitation in criminal cases differ from such statutes in civil cases,
in that in civil cases they are statutes of repose, while in criminal cases they create a
bar to the prosecution). The Defendant need not object in order to make the statute of
limitation applicable. Id. The statute of limitation “does not offer a privilege which
requires any action on the part of the accused either to accept or reject; that, on the
contrary, the state has seen fit to deprive itself of the right to prosecute in all cases
coming within the terms of the statute, and that the time within which an offense is
committed thus becomes a jurisdictional fact in all cases subject to limitation.” Bilbao
at 786.
There is no dispute that the “Amended Complaint” was not filed until after the
statute of limitation for a misdemeanor had passed. I.C. § 19-403 (a prosecution for any
misdemeanor must be commenced by the filing of the complaint or the finding of an
indictment within one (1) year after its commission). Although the State may amend a
complaint at any time before it rests, it is specifically provided by statute that a different
and distinct offense may not be charged by way of amended information. I.C. § 19-1420.
See also I.C.R. Rule 7(e). This would otherwise allow the State to circumvent the bar to
prosecution found in the statute of limitation.
Here, the State did charge a different and distinct offense in the “Amended
Complaint” of September 4, 2012.
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The amended complaint should be dismissed in violation of the limitations
statute.
C.
The initial August 11, 2011 uniform citation did not charge a crime, thus
any “amendment” of this uniform citation necessarily constitutes a different
and distinct offense.
It is long settled case law that a criminal information or indictment must properly
inform an accused of the exact nature of the charge against him, so that “(1) the accused
has the means to prepare a proper defense, and (2) he can protect himself against
subsequent prosecution based on the commission of the same acts.” State v. Grady, 89
Idaho 204 (1965), State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808, 814-15 (1967). The charging
document and criminal information must contain “(a) statement of the acts constituting
the offense in ordinary and concise language, and in such manner as to enable a person
of common understanding to know what is intended and must be direct and certain as
it regards (t)he particular circumstances of the offense charged, when they are necessary
to constitute a complete offense.’” Id. See also I.C. §§ 19-1409, 19-1411. It is “the facts
alleged, rather than the designation of the offense” which controls whether the State
has sufficiently stated the offense. State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 150 P. 39 at 40. (1915).
In this case the original uniform citation did not allege any facts sufficient to charge the
crime of second degree stalking under Idaho Code § 18-7906.
In order to commit second degree stalking under 18-7906, the person must
knowingly and maliciously “engage in a course conduct” i.e. repeated acts of
nonconsensual contact involving the victim. Idaho Code § 18–7906(2)(a). Allegation of
a repeated course of conduct is a necessary element of the crime. The uniform citation
in this case makes no such allegations. To the contrary, the uniform citation alleges two
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separate acts of “Stalking 2nd Degree” allegedly committed on the same day and at the
same time. Even a generous reading of the uniform citation leaves a person of common
understanding wondering what two repeated acts or what two repeated courses of
conduct were committed by Defendant on December 15, 2011 at 1800 hours. The lower
Court thus erred when it stated that no substantial changes were made between the
uniform citation and the amended complaint. (R. at 54). The obvious deficiencies with
the uniform citation, including the State’s confusing statutory reference to a nonexistent crime, left the Defendant in this case to guess what his faulty conduct was.
Under such circumstances, the uniform citation failed to adequately inform the
Defendant of the nature of the crime against him, and never charged a crime at all. Thus,
no crime was ever alleged against the Defendant until the “amended complaint” was
filed with the court on September 4, 2012. By that time the statute of limitations had
run and the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter.
The lower court clearly erred in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

PART II.
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENT OF MALICIOUS INTENT TO
ALARM, ANNOY OR HARASS.
A.

Required Intent Under the Stalking Statute.

Pursuant to I.C. § 18-114, in every crime or public offense there must exist a
union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence. The Idaho Supreme
Court however has declared that “[w]ith respect to the mental element of criminal
offenses, statutory requirement that in every crime or public offense there be a union,
or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence, does not mean that either
intent or criminal negligence is sufficient for the commission of any crime; rather, the
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mental state that is required for the commission of a particular offense is determined
by the language of the statute defining that offense.” I.C. § 18-114. State v. Crowe, 13
P.3d 1256, 135 Idaho 43 (2000).
Due process requires that a criminal defendant be tried only upon charges of
which he has notice. Const. Art. 1, § 13; U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. State v. Gilman,
105 Idaho 891, 673 P.2d 1085 (1983). Thus, the only proscribed criminal conduct is
that which is expressly declared by the legislature as interpreted by the courts.
In the charged offense, two mental intents are required, “…knowingly and
maliciously…” I.C. § 18-7906. The rule of statutory construction, ejusdem generis,
states that effect must be given to all of the words of the statute if possible, so that none
will be void, superfluous, or redundant. State v. Hart, 25 P.3d 850, 135 Idaho 827 (2001).
The use of the conjunctive “and” in Idaho Code § 18-7906 thus requires that the accused
act both knowingly and maliciously; the statute cannot be reasonably interpreted to
mean anything less than that two intents must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court must give effect to both of the words “knowingly” and “maliciously”
to avoid concluding that these words are merely redundant. The ejusdem generis rule
of statutory construction requires that effect must be given to all of the words of the
statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. Hart, at 850,
827. Thus, if the Court finds that “knowingly” simply requires a showing that the
Defendant intentionally engaged in a course of conduct which did alarm, annoy and
harass, the Court could not properly conclude that “maliciously” only requires the same
intentional engagement in such a course of conduct. The only logical interpretation
which gives full effect to both words is that the addition of the word “maliciously”
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requires the intent to vex, annoy, or injure Ms. Mullins. This intent must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no evidence in the record to support such a finding.
The reverse is also true, if malicious intent is proven by mere intention, then the
knowing intent must be given effect by requiring that the actor know that the conduct
is causing alarm, annoyance or harassment.
If the Defendant in this case acted in such a way as to be undetected, then the
State has not proven he acted with a malicious intent to engage in conduct intended to
alarm, annoy or harass the victim. This case would be substantially different if the actor
in this case had been made aware that Ms. Mullins had detected the disturbance of her
clothing and that this disturbance was causing her distress. No such evidence exists in
this case. To the contrary, if Ms. Mullins’ testimony is to be believed, the conduct was
ongoing for several days prior to Ms. Mullins and Mr. Dean going on a long trip to a
music festival in Custer County. By Ms. Mullins’ own testimony, Mr. Dean had no
indication from her that she had either detected the activity or was distressed by it.
Thus, even casting the evidence in the best light to the State, there is no evidence to
support a finding that the Defendant intended to vex, annoy, or injure Ms. Mullins in
any way, or that he knowingly did so.

B.

The State’s Theory of Malicious Intent

A.

“A wish to vex, annoy or injure.”

Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and dictate the
meaning of those terms as used in the statute. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477,
(2007). The statutory definition of “maliciously” is found in I.C. § 18-101(4) and reads
as follows: The words “malice,” and “maliciously,” import a wish to vex, annoy, or
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injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption of law.
In this case, the State failed to provide any evidence supporting that Mr. Dean in
any way intended to “vex, annoy, or injure” or “seriously alarm, annoy or harass” Ms.
Mullins. To the contrary, the record showed that Mr. Dean and Ms. Mullins shared a
friendly social interaction including a trip to a music festival, which involved them
sharing nearly the entire day together, during the alleged time period of the “pattern of
conduct” by Ms. Mullins. If Ms. Mullins’ testimony is presumed to be true, she noticed
that her apartment was being intruded upon with regularity as soon as Mr. Dean
returned to Lemhi County on August 6, 2011, a week before the trip together occurred
on August 13, 2011.
Ms. Mullins testified that she never informed Mr. Dean of the alleged intrusions
on her privacy. Mr. Dean could not reasonably have known that Ms. Mullins was
affected in any way by the alleged activity. If Mr. Dean was, as the State alleged,
engaging in clandestine activity, then his intent would have been to avoid detection,
and thus he would have no effect on her at all. As there was no indication to Mr. Dean
that Ms. Mullins was aware of his alleged activities, there is no evidence that Mr. Dean
intended to alarm, annoy or harass Ms. Mullins, as such a result would certainly have
required her awareness of the alleged activity.
B.

Intent to Commit a Wrongful Act

The alternative theory under the statutory definition of malice is the “intent to
do a wrongful act.” The Court must not err and accept that any wrongful act will do.
This issue has already been settled by the appellate court in Idaho. In State v. Nastoff,
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the State alleged that the Defendant had used a chain saw, which had been modified in
violation of I.C. § 38–121, starting a fire. State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667 (Ct. App. 1993).
While the state did not contend that Nastoff intended to start a fire by his operation of
the chain saw, the State argued Nastoff intended the “wrongful act” of operating a chain
saw in violation of I.C. § 38–121 and, the intent to do any wrongful act should constitute
the “malice” in support of a conviction for malicious injury to property. The State found
support for this argument in the fact that the definition of malice in I.C. § 18–101(4)
refers to intent to do a wrongful act, not the wrongful act.
But the district court in its appellate review rejected that suggestion, explaining
that the statute states that “one is guilty of the offense who ‘maliciously injures or
destroys ... property....’ The use of ‘maliciously’ to modify the verbs “injures or
destroys,” indicates that the act that must be performed with intent is the injuring or
destroying of property. Nastoff at 1091-1092, 669-670. “Hence, we conclude by its plain
language, I.C. § 18–7001 creates culpability for malicious injury to property only where
the defendant’s conduct causing the injury is accompanied by an intent to injure
property of another.” Id.
In this case, the State cannot prevail on a theory involving just any wrongful act,
but the specific act proscribed by the Stalking statute. Since that statute mirrors almost
verbatim the “vex, annoy, or injure” language, it must be concluded that the State had
to also prove that Mr. Dean intended to seriously alarm, annoy or harass Ms. Mullins.
C.

The Trial Court’s Finding Concerning Malicious Intent

The Trial Court correctly concluded that Mr. Dean was charged with a specific
intent crime. The Trial Court found that “Mr. Dean entered the area multiple times and
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touched or contacted Ms. Mullins under garments” (R at 71) and that “If discovered, he
would know that it would be foreseeable that she would be annoyed or disturbed.” (R
at 74-76). The Trial Court then cited to State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,23 P.3d 750,
(2009) for the proposition that as long as the defendant “could have foreseen the
consequences of his or her action that is sufﬁcient.” (R at 73-74).
Lampien clearly does not stand for such a proposition. Lampien was charged
with harboring and protecting a felon.

Police officers then gave victim impact

statements at her sentencing. Lampien argued that the police officers were not victims.
The Court was considering the definition of “victim” and whether Lampien caused
“injury” to the police officers. The Court was in the midst of a “true proximate cause”
analysis when it concluded the defendant remains “criminally liable if either the
possible consequence might reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant
should have foreseen the possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act.”
State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 375, 223 P.3d 750, 758 (2009). This was not an analysis
of the definition of malicious intent; it was a causation analysis.
The Trial Court conceded the logical flaw of its analysis: “The Court is aware of
the concern over the circularity of this reasoning. That is, the Court potentially has to
ﬁnd that there is an unlawful act ﬁrst in order to ﬁnd malice under this theory. In order
to ﬁnd an unlawful act under this set of circumstances, then malice is a component part
of that charge.” (R at 73-74).
The primary basis for the Court’s findings were challenged in a subsequent
Motion to Reconsider and Renewed Motion for Acquittal. The Trial Court conceded,
upon this motion, that an item the Trial Court had concluded was Ms. Mullins’
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underwear was instead a sock. Nevertheless, the Trial Court refused to acknowledge
that this made any difference concerning its conclusion that the items that were
touched were of an “intimate nature.”
D.

The District Court’s Ruling Concerning Malicious Intent.

In its decision, the District Court abandoned the Trial Court’s “foreseeability”
analysis and instead found that the evidence supported an “injury” claim against the
Defendant, referring to the “injure” term found in the statutory definition of “malice.”
The District Court concluded, without authority, that Mr. Dean had “repeatedly
intended to enter the victim’s dwelling without her permission, in contradiction of the
rental agreement, and without a pending emergency.” District Court Decision p. 3 (R at
117). No such finding is supported by the record. The District Court then went on to
suggest that the “entrance and subsequent rummaging of the victim’s personal items
can be classiﬁed as a trespass, an unlawful entry, an invasion of the victim’s right to
privacy, or a breach of contract.”
Thus, the District Court relied upon and declared that civil injuries of trespass,
invasion of privacy, and breach of contract could constitute a criminal injury to Ms.
Mullins. Rather than the foreseeability argument of the Trial Court, the District Court
averred that “each of these classiﬁcations [trespass, invasion of privacy, and breach of
contract] constitutes an injury to the victim for which there is a legal remedy.” Thus,
the District Court declared new law that the word “injury” in a civil context is the same
as “injure” in a criminal context.
A civil injury is not indictable under criminal law. Equating the intent to injure
another under a criminal statute to causing civil injury to a person would serve to
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violate the actor’s constitutional rights to notice by effectively incorporating civil torts
into a vague criminal statute. The separation of civil torts from criminal offenses is a
long settled principle of common law dating back to the early eighteenth century. The
Jurist cites Lord Ellenbourough in Rex v. Turner (13 East, 231) as explaining “I should
be sorry to have it doubted whether persons agreeing to…commit a civil trespass should
be thereby in peril of indictment for an offense which subject them to infamous
punishment.” Further, “without considering whether thereby any difference in point
of morals, the act done in the one case is a civil injury, and in the other a criminal
injury, which, whether well or ill founded, is a difference in point of law…and a
sensible and sufficient difference.” The Jurist, May 1, 1858 page 200 citing Rex v. Turner,
13 East, 231 and Rex v. Edwards, 8 Mod. 320 (1724).
It is thus error that the District Court found that the infliction of injury in a civil
context could rise to the level of injury in this criminal case, thereby creating a criminal
penalty for civil conduct without any prior notice to the public and in conflict with case
law which has been in place for centuries. There has been no such notice given by the
Idaho Legislature or by prior decisions of the courts.
A statute is impermissibly vague if it either (1) “fails to provide people of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits”
or (2) “authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). The courts must
consider whether a statute’s prohibitions “are set out in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with.” U.S.
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37
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L.Ed.2d 796 (1973).
We can find no support for an argument that the Idaho Legislature intended that
individuals committing civil torts against a victim could suddenly find themselves
subject to criminal prosecution under the stalking statute. Although the list of nonconsensual contacts could include conduct which would constitute a civil tort, the only
way proper notice would apply is if such non-consensual conduct directly implicated
a criminal intent to “seriously alarm, annoy or harass” the victim.
The District Court’s interpretation would have the effect of allowing a laundry
list of civil injuries to replace the criminal injury proscribed by the criminal statute.
Even if civil torts could possibly meet the definition of the term “injure” in the statutory
definition of malice found in the criminal code, it would effectively negate the necessity
that this malicious intent must be toward “seriously alarming, annoying or harassing”
the victim.
The reason both courts strain so significantly to malice in this case is because
there is no evidence in the record to support a finding or reasonable inference that the
Defendant had any ill will toward Ms. Mullins, and that he intended in some way to
alarm, annoy or harass her. This is perhaps the most critical element that would
separate stalking behavior from boorish behavior.
Similar to the civil tort of “sexual harassment,” stalking laws were not intended
to enforce general civility or prohibit general boorishness. cf. Annis v. Cty. of
Westchester, N.Y., 36 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1994) (Harassment must transcend coarse,
hostile, and boorish behavior to rise to the level of a constitutional tort); Edwards v.
Murphy-Brown, L.L.C., 760 F. Supp. 2d 607, 627 (E.D. Va. 2011) (Title VII is not a
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“general civility code.”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 at 81,
118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998); E.E.O.C. v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609
F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2010)) (While Title VII protects against sexual harassment, it
does not reach mere boorishness or crude behavior). If simple boorishness or crude
behavior is insufficient to rise to the level of the civil injury of sexual harassment, it
certainly cannot satisfy the requirements for criminal stalking.
E. Ambiguity and Lenity
In this case the only unlawful act alleged is stalking. Thus, the State was required
to prove that the Defendant maliciously intended to stalk his victim, not simply
intended the acts which the State alleged to be stalking.
A course of conduct is defined by Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(a) as repeated acts of
nonconsensual contact involving the victim. Nonconsensual contact is defined by
Idaho Code § 18-7906(2)(c) as any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued
without the victim’s consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent provided by the
victim, or that is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided
or discontinued.
In this case, the State’s only allegations of nonconsensual contact involved Mr.
Dean’s repeated entry onto or remaining on, property owned, leased, or occupied by the
victim. See criminal complaint (R at 8; 64). The State does not allege that the Defendant
initiated continued contact without prior consent, or beyond the scope of any consent.
The evidence indisputably confirms that the victim never expressed any desire that the
“contact” should be avoided. I.C. § 18-7906(2)(c)(4) does not proscribe conduct, but
rather is intended to provide an example of activities which could fall under the
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definition of nonconsensual contact, so long as the parameters of the general definition
are initially met.
The evidence leaves no doubt that Ms. Mullins did not own or lease the outer
bedroom or bathroom. The State thus relied on the language of the statute that Ms.
Mullins “occupied” the outer bedroom and bathroom. The State averred that the crime
of stalking can be committed if the Defendant repeatedly entered onto property which
Ms. Mullins “occupied.”
One cannot be found guilty of stalking simply by entering onto property
occupied by another. Such a prohibition would have the effect of an implied, nonexistent restraining order which could be violated any time a person entered a building
or even a public place which another person happens to “occupy.”
To give these examples any meaning, the entry onto property must be viewed in
the context of contact with the victim, which is initiated or continued without the
victim’s consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent provided by the victim; or that
is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or
discontinued.
The State in its complaint clearly relies on the theory that Ms. Mullins
“occupied” the outer bathroom and that Mr. Dean had repeatedly entered the bathroom.
This is not a “nonconsensual contact” because her mere occupancy of the room does
not convey to her a right to exclude, and thus the duty of another to gain consent prior
to entry. Nonconsensual contact must include the right to exclude an entry which in
turn requires the duty of another to gain consent. The right to consent exists only where
there is standing to object to entry.
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Take the example of Ms. Mullins coming over to visit the Deans’ residence. While
she certainly would in all senses of the word “occupy” their house at that moment, she
would not in any way have established a right to object to the Deans being present
without her consent. This could not be construed as a nonconsensual contact because
no consent is required.
Even if the trial court found that Ms. Mullins in some way “occupied” the outer
bathroom, no evidence supports that the Mr. Dean was required to obtain Ms. Mullins’
consent to enter it. This is essential to the State’s case, because without a finding of
nonconsensual entries into the outer bathroom, there is no course of conduct as
required by the statute. The State has only alleged a single theory in its complaint, based
on repeated entries. The State has not alleged any other form of contact. Thus, the
Defendant was only on notice to defend against this theory. To find violation of the
stalking law under some other theory would indisputably be a violation of Mr. Dean’s
due process rights.
If a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and the statute must
be construed in favor of the accused. State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848, (Ct.App.1998).
A statute is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be uncertain as to its
meaning. Ada County v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 854, 856, (Ct.App.1995). Where ambiguity
exists as to the elements of or potential sanctions for a crime, the Court should strictly
construe the statute in favor of the defendant. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, (1999);
State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, (2004).
If a violation of the statute by nonconsensual contact by entry into area occupied
by the victim cannot be distinguished from an innocent entry, the statute is
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ambiguously worded and the rule of lenity must be applied, construing the statute in
the light most favorable to the accused.
The only reasonable conclusion is that no injury occurred to Ms. Mullins and no
injury was intended by Mr. Dean. Thus, Mr. Dean’s actions did not constitute knowing
or malicious intent to cause such injuries, no course of prohibited conduct was engaged
in, and because the requisite intents were not proven, the judgement of conviction must
be vacated.
PART III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A
FINDING OF GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

A.

Unsupported Assumptions, Mistake of Fact

The Magistrate Court found that the act in this case was malicious because the
act involved items of intimate apparel. (R at 71). The Magistrate Court also found that
this finding was impeached because the intimate apparel was a white sock.
The Appellate Court disregarded the Magistrate Court’s reasoning and
substituted its own theory whereby civil injury to the alleged victim would satisfy the
element of malice and give rise to a criminal, indictable offense.
Neither of these theories provides a basis for stalking. There was no annoying,
vexing, or harassing behavior. The stalking statute is not meant to provide a bar for
boorish behavior, but is meant to deter criminal actions. Further, it is clear from Ms.
Mullins’ behavior that she was intending to set a trap for Mr. Dean.
Here, the magistrate court found that Ms. Mullins’ underwear was disturbed, (R.
at 71.), that it was her underwear in the video described as Exhibit 19, (R. at 71.), and
that the item in Photograph 301 is not a white sock, but a pair of underwear of unknown
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color belonging to Ms. Mullins, (R. at 71.),. Ms. Mullins further urged the trial court to
assume that Mr. Dean entered the apartment, or at least the outer bathroom, on every
occasion for which Ms. Mullins produced photographs without any evidence of entry
by Mr. Dean, (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 28:1-3, 60:20-24).
She wished to link one instance on the second video (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 18; June 24,
2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 41-42) to the disturbance of the clothing,
presumably because Mr. Dean demonstrated an interest in Ms. Mullins’ underwear as
he entered the common hallway on his way out of the apartment. The photos and the
video demonstrated definitively that the video does not show the Defendant sniffing
Ms. Mullins’ underwear as she testified, (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’
Testimony at 91:7-10).
Ms. Mullins testified that she did not disturb the laundry basket in the common
hallway in any way before taking a picture of its contents the morning after the second
video was recorded(June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 88-90). She
claimed that there was a pair of pink underwear in the basket which was under the pair
of jeans (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 92:2-9). This is pictured
in “Image 301”:
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Plainly visible in the image is a white sock, a pair of denim jeans, and then some
clothing under the jeans of unknown description. If the Defendant was sniffing Ms.
Mullins’ underwear as she testified, and she did not disturb the contents as she testified,
then the Defendant would have had to place the underwear under the jeans. When the
Court reviewed the second video it was indisputable that the dark object held to the
Defendant’s face could not be a sock, a pair of jeans or any other object from the basket
pictured in Image 301. See video at 7:14.
The object is dropped by the Defendant from waist height, without bending over.
Image 301 clearly shows that a pair of underwear could not have landed in such a way
as to be anywhere except on the top of the basket’s contents. It would have clearly been
on top of the jeans. Further, the object in question could not have been the jeans,
because the jeans would have been on top of the white sock. Finally, the dark object
could not have been the white sock, as the sock was light colored and the object was
dark colored. Therefore, the witness and the State could not positively identify what
the item was, or even that it was from the laundry basket. The Magistrate Court took
these asserted assumptions and incorrectly found the item to be a pair of non-existent
underwear, (R. at 71.).
Just as importantly, the actions of the Defendant in the second video are not
consistent with someone looking for undergarments. Mr. Dean is seen clearly inspecting
the structure, including the kitchen. A passage from the Idaho Attorney General’s
Landlord Tenant Handbook sheds some light on the Property owner’s rights:
“Because Idaho law says nothing as to whether the
landlord has the right to enter the premises, the rental
agreement should reserve to the landlord the right to enter
the property to make repairs, to inspect for damage, to show
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the property to prospective purchasers, and to show the
property to prospective tenants near the end of the lease, as
long as such entry is at a reasonable time and is done in a
reasonable manner. In addition, a provision should be
included in the rental agreement explaining the landlord’s
rights when a tenant is in default in the rent and has been
absent from the premises for a considerable period of time.
“If the rental agreement does not address the
landlord’s right to enter the premises, the landlord should
notify the tenant as to the necessity of entry, requesting
permission to enter in a reasonable manner. The tenant
should not refuse permission for reasonable entry by the
landlord.
Although the law is not clear, a landlord who has
reasonable cause to believe that damage is occurring to the
property probably has the right to enter to inspect for
damage.
Here, there was no lease agreement at the time of the alleged intrusions, so there
are no written lease agreement terms to draw from (September 18, 2012 Transcript of
Cynthia Dean’s Testimony at 11-12; June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony
at 98:24-25). Because of that, it is reasonable that Mr. Dean had a right to enter, without
notice, the areas of the apartment that Ms. Mullins allegedly occupied and inspect them
for damage.
Alternatively, Ms. Mullins, motivated by anger, could have surreptitiously
videotaped Mr. Dean and fabricated her story. Ms. Mullins may have been made aware
by Mr. Dean that he would be entering her apartment. The deputies had told her there
was no case unless the video captured the Defendant’s face, so she set up the camera
knowing Mr. Dean would be entering the apartment. Minutes after she leaves, Mr. Dean
enters the apartment, apparently aware that Ms. Mullins has left. Ms. Mullins could
have accomplished this by simply telling him she was leaving and allowing him to
enter.
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These mistakes of fact open the door to reasonable doubt by proposing an
alternative sequence of events culminating in a criminal charge.

B.

Reasonable Doubt.

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary
is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal. Idaho Code § 19-2104. Reasonable doubt is defined as
follows:
It is not merely possible doubt, because everything
related to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence,
is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state
of the case, which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence, leaves the mind of the
jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the
charge. Idaho Jury Instruction 103.
The above facts clearly constituted reasonable doubt in this case. Ms. Mullins
states that she was scared, betrayed, and disgusted by the entries, (June 24, 2013
Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 34:24, 39:8), yet she never contacted Mr. Dean
about them, (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 62-63, 68-69.).
Carmen is a remote town where neighbors and traffic are few and far between. If Ms.
Mullins had any inkling of concern with the safety of her apartment or unwanted
visitors, Mr. Dean should have been her first point of contact, immediately upon
noticing the disturbances. Instead, she claimed that she noticed the disturbances
beginning August 6 and then went on a day-long excursion to a concert in a neighboring
county with the man who must have been the prime suspect. She claimed that the
disturbances were occurring regularly, but did not decide to take photographs until
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after an incident where she claims Mr. Dean “came on to her” (June 24, 2013 Transcript
of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 66-68).
When she began to take pictures, her clothes were disturbed every time she left.
To believe Ms. Mullins’ testimony or lend any credibility to her, the Court would
believe that Mr. Dean never took a break, but ran up into her apartment every single
time Ms. Mullins left (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 82, 60:1324). Further, the Court would need to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the clothing
was disturbed by Mr. Dean, of which there is no direct evidence in the record, and not
by Ms. Mullins herself in order to further fabricate evidence of wrong-doing.
What is also telling is the difference between what Ms. Mullins showed the
deputies and the pictures she actually took. For example, Ms. Mullins turned in Image
293 to the deputies, but not Image 294, which clearly showed a balloon next to the
clothing.

The balloon is indicative that Ms. Mullins’ child had likely been playing in the
outer bathroom prior to her taking the picture, providing yet another reason for the
clothing to have been disturbed. Likewise, neither picture of the basket were turned in
to the deputies (Images 301 and 302).
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Even if it were conceded that Mr. Dean entered the outer bathroom, there is
nothing on the first video to show that he did anything to Ms. Mullins clothing. There
is nothing on the second video to tie Mr. Dean to a disturbance of Ms. Mullins’ clothing
except what he appears to pick up in the common hallway near the washer and dryer.
The item in question, as previously discussed, was either removed from the basket prior
to the photographs being taken (Images 301 and 302) the next morning, or was not an
item from the basket.

The second video showed that the entry into the leased apartment was for a
legitimate purpose. Mr. Dean was seen scanning the ceiling, all of the southern rooms
including the kitchen, and other areas of the apartment, which clearly would hold no
interest to someone looking for Ms. Mullins’ underwear. By careful analysis of the
evidence, it is well beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dean did NOT enter the
apartment to sniff a pair of Ms. Mullins’ underwear as she alleges. It is more likely that
Ms. Mullins removed the dark colored item before she photographed the laundry
basket. The only logical conclusion as to why Ms. Mullins removed this object is that it
could be exculpatory and otherwise show the innocent nature of Mr. Dean’s actions.
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Ms. Mullins only photographed the apartment on August 16, after success with
the video, and did not set up the video in the inner bedroom. These facts indicate that
it is more likely than not that these photographs were being staged.
This is not a matter of reasonable inference, but rather the State called upon the
trial court to speculate as to whether the entry was for a legitimate purpose. Speculation
is not reasonable inference; it is reasonable doubt. The trial court should not have made
the assumption that Mr. Dean disturbed any of the clothing photographed by Ms.
Mullins. It is apparent that the idea of posing these photographs only came to Ms.
Mullins after the Custer County incident where she claimed Mr. Dean “made a pass” at
her. Ms. Mullins testified that she owed a substantial amount of back rent to the Deans.
By claiming that she was victimized by Mr. Dean, Ms. Mullins no doubt hoped to relieve
herself of this debt, while simultaneously getting revenge for Mr. Dean’s unwelcome
advance on her.

C.

Subjective and Objective Effects on the Victim

Pursuant to the stalking statute in Idaho, the course of conduct alleged must
“alarm, annoy or harass the victim” and be such as would cause “a reasonable person
substantial emotional distress.” I. C. §7906.
Ms. Mullins’ testimony brought the true nature of her reaction to these incidents
to light. First, Ms. Mullins testified that the incidents occurred daily beginning on
August 6, yet she made no inquiry of her landlord whether he had needed to enter her
apartment or whether he had seen anyone else enter her apartment. She did not ask
him to look out for strangers in the area. Ms. Mullins did not live downtown in a
congested neighborhood and there was never any sign of forced entry. Common sense
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would indicate that Ms. Mullins should have immediately suspected Mr. Dean when
the incidents began, since that coincided with the day he returned to the area.
The Court was left to wonder what caused such a significant change in the way
Ms. Mullins reacted to the intrusions on August 14 when she began taking pictures and
videos shortly before reporting the incidents to the Sheriff’s office. Ms. Mullins stated
that the intrusions began on August 6 and that she reported this to family members, yet
she continued to spend each night at the apartment and made no reports to law
enforcement or her landlord. (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at
62-63) She allegedly took photographs on August 14 “proving” that the clothing was
disturbed in the outer bathroom, but did not report this to law enforcement or her
landlord. She was allegedly extremely distressed by the capture of her landlord’s shoes
in video one, but showed no apparent distress as she casually went about setting up the
camera for the second video alone in the apartment.
Perhaps most telling is her lack of reaction to the purported intrusions which
existed prior to the trip with Mr. Dean to the concert, as compared to what she testified
to be a sudden and substantial shift in her attitude after the trip. (June 24, 2013
Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 34:24, 39:8) Ms. Mullins testified this was
because Mr. Dean made a pass at her. The term Ms. Mullins used at one point in her
testimony was that she felt “betrayed.” (June 24, 2013 Transcript of Ms. Mullins’
Testimony at 34:24, 39:8) Ms. Mullins testified about a dramatic change in her emotions
only after this trip and “betrayal” by Mr. Dean. This does not support a finding that Ms.
Mullins was alarmed, annoyed, scared, or injured, but rather that she was angry.
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Regardless whether the court finds any particular activity boorish, crude or even
immoral, and even if the trial court were to assume the worst in this case, such conduct
does not rise to the level of criminal conduct unless it is expressly proscribed by the
legislature. The difficulty in determining where a line might be crossed is demonstrated
in the complex way stalking is defined in the applicable statute. In this case, it would
not be enough for Ms. Mullins or even the Court to disapprove of what Mr. Dean said,
or even of the conduct insinuated by the State. The conduct itself must arise to
harassment accompanied rationally by “severe emotional distress.” I.C. § 7906 (1)(a).
If the conduct itself was ongoing as of August 6, and caused no such severe
emotional distress for a full week, then the Court cannot rationally find that the
character of the emotional response suddenly became severe after August 14. In
reviewing the evidence, it appears that it was the nature of the relationship between
Ms. Mullins and Mr. Dean that changed and not the purported conduct. Her testimony
betrays her feelings of anger with no indication of annoyance, fear, or alarm. Only after
the trip together to Custer County where she alleged an inappropriate remark did
documentation of the intrusions suddenly appear in the form of photos.
The trial court should not have simply dismissed the possibility that these
photographs were staged. If Ms. Mullins wanted to move out after Mr. Dean’s alleged
inappropriate advances, then she clearly had a motive to create a false stalking case
against him as a means of avoiding the payment of back rent and potentially any other
penalties from breaching the lease.
The video of the shoes in the bathroom shows nothing other than Mr. Dean
entered the outer bathroom. The second video shows nothing other than he entered the
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apartment to make an inspection. It seems more likely than not that Ms. Mullins knew
that Mr. Dean would be entering her apartment and may have even notified him that
she was leaving in order to set him up. Whatever item was placed in or near the laundry
basket was intended to attract Mr. Dean’s attention and then to lead the viewer of the
video to believe that Mr. Dean was doing something unseemly, while the rest of the
video clearly shows the nature of the entry to be legitimate and innocent. The darkcolored, unidentified item was then removed and a picture of the laundry basket was
taken the next day. Ms. Mullins apparently then decided not to turn the pictures of the
laundry basket over to the deputies. Compare the exhibit of “pictures turned in” to the
exhibit of the pictures found on her phone.
Even if Ms. Mullins didn’t stage the photographs, leaving a pile of clothes, which
included her underwear, out in a common area to which others have access, cannot
reasonably be construed as a decision consistent with someone suffering severe
emotional distress as a result of the disturbances. If a person wants to keep something
out of the reach of others, they do not leave it in a common area to which other people
have unfettered access. There was no legitimate reason to keep leaving her underwear
on the floor in the outer bathroom, a few steps from a laundry basket.
Only one submitted photo even suggests a disturbance in the leased area of the
apartment. Ms. Mullins confirmed in her testimony, that there were no intrusions
detected in any other part of the upstairs until the second video. (June 24, 2013
Transcript of Ms. Mullins’ Testimony at 100-101) The State has described the common
hallway and the outer bedroom and bathroom areas as “occupied” by Ms. Mullins, but
it is undisputed that she did not have the right to exclude the Deans from those areas.
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Such intrusions in a common area could not be described as intending severe emotional
distress, and in fact may have an innocent cause, such as moving the clothing to clean
or make repairs. The mere entry into the apartment by a landlord for the purpose of
inspection would not cause a reasonable person severe emotional distress. Although
the second video shows Mr. Dean entering the apartment, the trial court should not
have concluded to a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, that this entry was without
legitimate purpose. The actions of Mr. Dean seen on the video, looking about high and
low at the various rooms, walls, and ceilings, clearly indicates that he is inspecting the
area in a manner inconsistent with looking for Ms. Mullins’ clothing. Ms. Mullins
testified that no photo was taken of anything in her bedroom the night of this second
video because she found nothing disturbed in her bedroom.
Because the State failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, what the pattern of
conduct was, it is far beyond the purview of reasonable inference for the Court to fill in
the blanks with a finding that the inferred conduct would induce a reasonable person
to incur severe emotional distress. Further, while Ms. Mullins apparently felt betrayed
by Mr. Dean’s comment, anger does not constitute alarm, annoyance, or harassment.

D.

Cumulative Errors

“Under the cumulative errors doctrine, an accumulation of irregularities, each of
which might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial
in contravention of the defendant’s right to due process.” State v. Martinez,125 Idaho
445, 453, (1994). For the cumulative error doctrine to apply there must have been more
than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, (Ct.App.1998).
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Even if these errors individually do not arise to a level granting the appeal, the
multiple errors in this case implicate a basic lack of due process and the conviction
should be vacated.

V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE the Defendant requests that the Judgment of Conviction be
Vacated and the charge dismissed. In the alternative, the Defendant requests that the
Judgment of Conviction be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.
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